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AMERICA

Jack Ludwig

The President of the United States, a political partisan, whose partisan policies must be passed by a partisan and divided congress, should be, on the level of policy, disinterested (or appear disinterested) and nonpartisan (or appear nonpartisan). He is like a judge pressured by any number of unambiguously partisan advocates—the men in his cabinet, the Senate, the House, governors, industry, unions, Europeans, Asians, South Americans. Ideally he listens to all. And identifies totally with none. Ideally, again, he seeks unanimity but skirts uniformity. Tries to keep unity without muffling dissent. Argues his cause but doesn't claim infallibility. Rewards his supporters but doesn't wipe out his opposition, punish it or starve it. His great asset is a certain mystery: nobody should be able to tell exactly which advocated position the President ultimately will take. Looking for clues one should find the Secretary of State saying something slightly different from the Secretary of Defense, or the Army Chiefs of Staff, or the CIA, or the CIO or, to be ideal again, the Vice-President. Those who do disagree with the President must not be classed as children (who need paternal education), or fools (who need wising up) or knaves (who need public chastisement). Nor must dissent be taken as proof of brainlessness, gutlessness or Nervous Nelly eunuchoidia. A student on any campus must be able to act foolishly or speak outrageously without inviting the President's scorn, the Vice-President's responsibility speech or a local fink's mimeographed-in-Washington bore job.

There is nothing ideal about Lyndon Johnson as President. He is at once partisan, cranky, brutal and castrating. His "Nervous Nellies" speech belongs to an old American archetype, the clean good unswayed unmuddled decisive man-of-action rounding up a posse of real men for an unquestioned right cause. That the Chicago speech carried overtones of a lynch mob was certainly not Johnson's intention, yet the signs were unmistakably there. Nor, when he says he will not force the American boys in Vietnam to fight with one or two hands behind their backs is he trying to sound like MacArthur trying to cross the Yalu; but that's where we are with Johnson now; that's where we've been ever since the decision to escalate was made. Once, let me recall, Rusk was buried to the nostrils in a no-waves posture—I mean before Johnson became President; now Rusk makes that speech about the rape of Czechoslovakia, and

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### AS A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE

# How JFK Learned Of

# Cuba Invasion Plans

John F. Kennedy knew about the planned Bay of Pigs invasion during the 1960 presidential campaign, according to two newspapermen.

The assertion appeared Monday in a Look magazine article by Thomas B. Ross and David Wise.

Ross is a member of the Washington bureau of The Sun-Times, and Wise is chief of the Washington bureau of the New York Herald Tribune.

#### The Nixon Charge

Richard M. Nixon charged in his book, "Six Crises," that Kennedy as a candidate received a Central. Intelligence Agency briefing on the proposed Cuban operation.

In 1962, following publication of the book, the White House issued a denial that was supported by Allen W. Dulles, who had retired as CIA director in 1961.

The White House said that Kennedy's briefing by Dulles in 1960 had been general in nature. It said Kennedy "was not told "... of the training



DAVID WISE THOMAS B. ROSS

of troops outside of Cuba or of any plans for 'supporting an invasion of Cuba..'"

#### No Dispute, But . . .

Dulles described the Nixon charge as a "misunderstanding" and said the briefings "did not cover our own government's plans or programs for action, overt or covert."

Ross and Wise do not dispute the White House version of the CIA briefings. But they say Kennedy had knowledge of the invasion plans from other sources.

According to the Look article:

"Exactly what was said during Dulles's briefings of Ken-

nedy . . . will never be known for certain, since the meeting was top secret and unrecorded.

"But there is some evidence that Kennedy did not want to be briefed on operational matters—such as the Cuban invasion — because this might have limited his freedom of action.

#### 'Missed The Point'

"In any event, Nixon's dispute with Kennedy and Dulles . . . missed the point.

"Regardless of the content of the CIA briefings, the Kennedy camp had learned informally from other sources that an exile invasion was hatching."

Ross and Wise wrote that Nixon, the Republican presidential candidate, "was hoping for the invasion before Nov. 8" on the theory he would win the election easily "if the Eisenhower administration destroyed Fidel Castro in the closing days of the presidential campaign."

And this, according to the newspapermen, "was exactly what the Kennedy strategists, hoped would not happen."

The abortive invasion oc-

Peace Corps And CIA

The magazine article was adapted from a Ross-Wisebook, "The Invisible Government," which will be published in June by Random House.

It includes a report that Kennedy as President personally ordered the CIA to avoid involvement with the Peace Corps headed by R. Sargent Shriver Jr. Wrote Ross and Wice.

"When Sargent Shriver was organizing the Peace Corps, he realized that the new agency, with its thousands of young, volunteers dispersed over the globe, could well look like an all-but-irresistible 'cover' to the

"He was also aware that even one 'spy' incident involving a volunteer might destroy the corps, and privately proclaimed his determination to do everything he could to divorce it from even the faintest smell of intelligence work.

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### W. Averell Harriman . . .

## Statesman Now in Partial Eclipse

By JAMES W. CANAN The Courier-News Bureau

Washington — W. Averell Harriman, who won renown for his foreign policy feats in the Kennedy administration. has become a mystery man under President Johnson.

To a surprising degree, knowledgeable sources at the State Department profess, in might do well to share their apparent sincerity, that they considerable knowledge of apparent sincerity, that they just don't know what's happening to the fortunes of the 72-year-old statesman.

It would appear that Harriand ambassador has come back from near-oblivion so many times in the past that those who have watched his career and worked with him hesitate to count him out for good.

Nevertheless it is safe to say that he has been shunted aside for the time being in the Johnson scheme of things.

HARRIMAN IS due back next week from what the White House described as an "important" fact-finding mission to Africa.

Johnson's sending Harriman to Africa raised a question, however as to the reasoning behind the President's choice of emissary.

G. Mennen (Soapy) Williams, assistant secretary of state for African affairs, has been to Africa many times, and should be as knowledgeable as anyone Johnson could consult or send there again.

Moreover, several other. viously are more Harriman's meat.

Adding to the puzzlement ! are reliable reports that Johnson has resisted being briefed on Africa by Central Intelligence Agency experts who think the President the continent.

Thus, Johnson's concern for Africa does not seem deep enough to warrant his detailman is in eclipse. Yet the ing a State Department offi-former New York Governor cial of Harriman's stature to make still another swing through its trouble spots.

Could it be that Johnson decided on a trip to Africa as a good way to get Harriman out of town and indicate demotion?

ACCORDING TO State Department spokesmen who should be expected to know, it's hard to tell, right now.

"One thing I am sure of," said one, "is that Harriman was very close to President Kennedy, but he is not close to President Johnson. It is accurate to say that since Johnson became President, Harriman has not been consulted on Vietnam."

He said this could be interpreted as a strange turn of fortune for the man who probably did more than anyone in the Kennedy administration to shape foreign policy in the Far East.

Johnson's lack of communi parts of the world-notably cation with Harriman on Vict-Russia and the Far East-ob-; nam could be explained, on the surface, by the fact that Kennedy had promoted Harriman from assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs to undersecretary of state, thus removing him from front-line involvement with the sticky business of devising ways to beat back the Viet Cong guerrillas. But it hardly makes sense,

in the minds of those who admire Harriman's work, that Johnson would not avail himself of Harriman's expertise on the Far East in taying to decide what to do next in. Vietnam.

PERHAPS THE explanation is that Harriman, like; Roger Hilsman, got into trouble with Johnson as a result of the views they apparently shared on how to handle the Asian war-that-isn't-a-war.

Hilsman succeeded Harriman as assistant secretary for the Far East, and was regarded as more or less Harriman's In trying to find out what protege. His abrupt resigna is happening to Harriman,

when he was vice president, South Vietnam President Diem, who subsequently was! downfall.

tion from the post last month the impression is strong that left little doubt that Johnson foreign policy officials who had become disenchanted talked freely about internal with him, and perhaps others political matters under Kennedy are much more chary It seems /that Johnson, of doing so nowadays.

This could be due to indeveloped a high regard for creased pressure from above. Or it could be simply that no one wants to write off the overthrown. Harriman and man who bounded back from Hilsman reportedly had no defeat in New York to negosuch regard for Diem and tiate the Test-Ban Treaty and were not dismayed by his once again, at his age, became a force in world affairs.